Abstract: Recent work demonstrates the importance of developing high quality output in order to compete in export markets and other recent studies verify the prevalence of fixed and ongoing trade costs while participating in those markets. I consider the joint choice of quality and export promotion costs when trade relationships are subject to temporary disputes. When transparency is low and macroeconomic instability is high, disputes arrive more frequently and, therefore, firms may inefficiently choose lower levels of quality and export promotion. These, in turn, build shallower trading relationships with less trade volumes and higher tariffs, and generate greater trade reductions during the more common trade disputes. Several institutional features of the WTO that are generally lacking in preferential trade agreements such as improved transparency, dispute investigation, and the provision to recommend asymmetric continuation payoffs can ameliorate these inefficient quality choice outcomes. Hence, lower quality output and lower quality trading relationships may be more endemic to countries that depend on preferential trading areas as opposed to the WTO. JEL Classification: F13, F15, C73, K33.
Introduction
The importance of producing high-quality output has begun to receive serious attention in the international trade literature. One group of studies demonstrates that high-quality production is critical in fostering economic growth and development. 1 Another group of recent studies suggests that developing high-quality production skills is necessary for firms that export. 2 On the other hand, participating in those export markets requires ongoing trade and export promotion costs. 3 In this paper we analyze how the joint decision over export quality and the commitment to trade costs are made when trade relationships are subject to temporary disputes. Our idea is that the quality of the trading arrangement can have important and previously unrealized effects on the quality of output.
Trade disputes occur periodically in the multilateral trading system (WTO) as well as in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 4 These disputes may be triggered by egregious actions (such as dumping), however, when trade policies are not perfectly transparent they may also be triggered by macroeconomic or preference fluctuations (and erroneous antidumping claims). Evidence that developing countries use antidumping actions in response to macroeconomic shocks is given by Bown (2007) . The use of antidumping measures, however, are not at all limited to developing countries. The majority of dumping allegations have been made by OECD countries and as Prusa (1991 Prusa ( , 1997 Prusa ( , 2001 ), Blonigen and Bown (2003) , Blonigen and Prusa (2003) , and Prusa and Skeath (2004) have demonstrated, these claims are not usually triggered by dumping, however, they are facilitated by imperfect observability of the 1 See for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Hausman et al., (2006) , and Rauch (2007) . Early analyses are provided by Linder (1961) and Vernon (1966) . 2 Alvarez and Lopez (2005) provide evidence for Chile, Brooks (2006) for Colombia, and Hallak (2006) for a larger group of countries. 3 Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das et al. (2007) provide evidence of these costs for Columbia. Evidence for France is provided by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2006) . These costs are related to the theories of export hysteresis developed by Baldwin and Krugman (1989) , and Dixit (1989) , and, more recently, by Alessandria et al. (2008) . 4 In this paper disputes refer to those brought about by claims of unfair trade practices such as those described in Article VI of the GATT ( antidumping and countervailing duties). Disputes in the present context do not refer to safeguards for emergency protection of a threatened industry (GATT Article XIX), exceptions for moral, health or environmental concerns (GATT Article XX), or renegotiation (GATT Article XXVIII). This distinction is relevant here because we model trade disputes as being generated by the misinterpretation of macroeconomic and preference fluctuations rather than a response to a stated change in importer policy. Antidumping claims are important for consideration because they have comprised the majority of safeguard and exceptions filed under the GATT/WTO. available evidence.
To develop the relationship between quality choice and trade disputes we consider a dynamic game of tariff liberalization between two production economies with exogenous shocks that generate periodic trade wars. The cooperative level of trade barriers (as represented by an equivalent tariff) are enforced by the threat of retaliatory punitive tariffs. In addition to opportunistic behavior, however, the terms of trade is affected by macroeconomic and preference fluctuations. Even when countries do not wish to abrogate a trade agreement these external shocks can generate disputes. We consider trigger strategies as introduced by Green and Porter (1984) and adapt them to the international trade framework using the results of Abreu et al. (1990) and Fudenberg et al. (1994) . Hence, exogenous shocks generate trade wars even when both countries abide by the agreement. These fluctuations are more likely to trigger disputes when non-tariff barriers are less transparent, or when countries choose not to see them clearly.
Quality choice is made by firms at the inception of the trade agreement. We assume that the incremental, and ongoing, trade, export promotion, and product development costs are related to the quality choice. In particular, higher quality products require that a higher percentage of these costs be paid in every period, even during a period of reduced export receipts, such as those that arrive during a trade dispute. Our idea is that irreversibilities arise from developing and maintaining network and sales infrastructure in the importing country, however, they may also arise from increasing output in an export sector or fitting exports to the importing country's standards.
Our first main result is that when transparency is low and macroeconomic instability is high, so that trade disputes are more common, firms may inefficiently choose lower levels of quality and of export promotion in order to avoid the greater irreversibility that accompanies higher quality. We next show that the quality and irreversibility choices generated by stability and/ or transparency affect the quality of the trade relationship. In particular, lower-quality more easily-reversible output generates shallower trading relationships with less trade volumes and higher tariffs. Furthermore, it generates greater trade reductions during each of the more frequently occurring trade disputes. In this way trade disputes affect not only quality choice but also the resulting level of economic integration. The idea that the quality of trading Our third main point is then that the quality of dispute settlement matters. First, the improved transparency in the WTO reduces the frequency of disputes. Second, the increased enforcement capability of the WTO allows them the provision to recommend targeted retaliation and temporary asymmetric continuation payoffs. These are shown here to generate superior quality and integration outcomes than the symmetric trade wars evidenced in many PTAs. 10, 11 Hence, lower quality output and lower quality trading relationships may be more endemic to countries whose trade is more concentrated within an unstable PTA as opposed to the WTO. Furthermore, limited integration may help explain why many PTAs are stillborn, and many others lead to no noticeable trade creation or diversion. Even Mercosur, which is the world's largest enabling clause justified PTA, has led mostly to trade diversion of lower quality products in which the region does not have a comparative advantage (Yeats, 1998) . The limited economic integration in Mercosur was well expressed as "the main rule in place within Mercosur goes something like, 'When the going gets tough, it's every country for itself.'" 12 A similar quality outcome occurred in the Central American Common Market (Fox, 2004 ).
This paper is most closely related to the literature on the hold-up problem in international trade and that on trade agreements. Lapan (1988) was the first to recognize that the optimal tariff after production has occurred is greater than the ex-ante optimal tariff. Internalizing this time inconsistency in tariff setting can lead to lower output levels and leave both countries worse off. In McLaren (1997) , factor allocation precedes a trade agreement. Because governments can give side payments, agents do not internalize the erosion in national bargaining power caused by their actions. If free trade is expected, then factors will accumulate in the export sector causing an increase in the optimal tariff that can be levied 10 For example, recent WTO administered disputes over bananas, foreign sales corporations, and the distribution of antidumping duties on steel were settled with the dispensation of only the offended party levying retaliatory tariffs for an indeterminate, but finite, period of time. Alternatively, Mercosur's newest incarnation of the "refrigerator war" has generated escalating rounds of reciprocal tariff increases by Argentina and Brazil. This escalation has occurred with the help of a new bilateral trade dispute resolution process entitled "Mechanism of Competitive Adaptation" that allows these two countries to review their disputes in a separate non-Mercosur proceeding. 11 An additional difference that we do not consider here is that several PTAs such as the Andean pact, CACM, COMESA, the EFTA, and NAFTA allow private individuals to file claims which certainly must increase the potential for trade disputes. 12 Marcos Jank of the Institute for International Trade Negotiations, Sao Paulo cited by Clendenning (2004) . against this country. In this case, the resulting side payment in the trade agreement may be so large as to leave the country worse off under an optimistic expectation of free trade than under an expectation of a trade war. Chisik (2003) does not allow for side payments as in McLaren (1997) and shows that this can cause countries to liberalize slowly, however, as the export capacity is developed over time countries become more integrated and trade barriers are gradually eroded. Hence, in the Chisik (2003) case the hold-up problem is gradually mitigated by successful past liberalizations. The introduction of imperfect observability, instability, and trade disputes, in this paper returns us to a form of the hold-up problem, however, it is imperfections in the potential solution (the trade agreement) that allows for the problem to occur. And in this case, it is not only export levels and tariffs that are distorted but also output quality and the degree of economic integration.
Mill (1844) is perhaps the first to consider the terms-of trade rational for trade agreements and Johnson (1953 Johnson ( -1954 is the first formalization of this idea. Recognizing that there are no "blue helmets"
to enforce trade agreements (Bello, 1996) authors such as Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1990 , 1999 , 2002 began to look at trade agreements as self-enforcing outcomes in a repeated game framework. Hungerford (1991) and Riezman (1991) also consider imperfect observability of trade barriers that could generate trade wars in equilibrium, however, their focuses are distinct and both papers differ from this one in several important respects. Neither considers production, irreversibility, or quality choice, and both consider only symmetric continuation payoffs. More recent work by Staiger (2005), Lee (2007) , and Martin and Vergote (2007) consider trade disputes in equilibrium arising in frameworks with private information about domestic concerns and political pressure. As a result of their focus on incomplete information, in a sense, their papers are more apt descriptions of safeguards brought under GATT articles XIX, XX, or XXVIII, rather than the article VI safeguards considered in this paper. 13 A larger distinction is that their focus is not on firm quality choice, irreversibilities, or integration.
13 Martin and Vergote (2007) do consider antidumping, however, in their paper it arises from private political pressure and the desire to temporarily renegotiate the agreement as allowed for in Article XXVIII. In this paper, we are more concerned with abuse of Article VI that arises from imperfect rather than incomplete information.
Furthermore, we make a distinction between available remedies in the WTO and their relative paucity in PTAs.
The next section describes the model and derives the inefficient equilibrium in the absence of a trade agreement. The third section considers our first two main results and considers the uninformed dispute settlement that is more typical of PTAs. The fourth section considers how the WTO's informed dispute settlement can partially ameliorate the quality selection issue and it also helps to highlight the problem of selective misinterpretation of trade barriers. The fifth section contains our conclusions.
The Model
We consider a repeated tariff setting game between the governments of two production economies with production irreversibilities. The home country (x) produces and exports good x, the foreign country (y) produces and exports good y, and both produce a numeraire good which is traded to ensure trade balance. 14 Each export good can be further divided into quality levels, k. Quality levels differ in their value to consumers (θ jk ) and the degree of irreversibility (ρ jk ).
The preferences of the identical agents, in each country, over consumption of the import goods and the numeraire can be represented by a quasilinear utility function. 15 Consumer utility maximization 14 Irreversible production is more transparently analyzed with the inclusion of a numeraire good. The numeraire good is produced with the same constant returns to scale technology in both countries. The labor supply is assumed sufficiently large so that there is positive numeraire production in both countries and the wage is equal to the price of the numeraire good, which is normalized to one. Hence, the market value of the labor endowment is constant in all possible outcomes and is ignored. 15 We can, therefore, restrict our analysis to the aggregate utility function. This utility function takes the following form:
The large number of identical agents are each endowed with one unit of effective labor. These agents sell their labor to the firms and, as the firms' owners, they receive an equal share of the firms' profits. The agents also share equally any tariff revenue. There is no opportunity for saving and investment, and all agents are identical, therefore, there are no intertemporal or income distribution considerations, and the agents spend their entire income in every period on consumption of the firm's products. The strategic possibilities of the agents and firms are limited by their large numbers and are, therefore, ignored in the set of equilibria that we analyze below. Given the competitive behavior of the agents and the firms, each government chooses non-negative tariffs ( , P is the consumer price in the importing country in period t. We assume that consumers value higher quality so that θ jk is larger for higher quality. Note that we do not consider a country consuming its own export good. That is, we assume that markets are segmented, and we consider the export market. Similarly, we assume that there is no import competing production. These two assumption have no effect on the results, however, it makes their derivation more transparent.
In addition to the normalized price of the numeraire good, there are four prices , , , In an initial period firms choose a quality level and a maximum output level. Given that consumers are identical all firms will choose the same quality level. Production of the non-numeraire goods is only partially reversible so that, in any period, firms can reduce output to ρ percent of the period 1 level.
where Q jkt denotes output of quality k in sector j in period t and ρ jk is the good specific measure of irreversibility. We use Q jk to denote Q jk1 . Equation 2 indicates that output levels are bounded below by the firm's period 1 decision and by the given irreversibility parameter.
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This irreversibility assumption can be motivated by the need to develop and maintain networks and sales infrastructure in the importing country. 17 Higher quality products involve a more detailed and harder to learn production process and they may also require more export promotion, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that higher quality is correlated with greater irreversibility. Some of these expenses are sunk at the time of export expansion, however, many are also ongoing costs whose irreversibility stems from explicit contracts (such as advertising, brand name and sales infrastructure maintenance) and implicit contracts (such as maintaining networks and political favor). Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das et al. (2007) provide evidence that, for Colombian firms, these costs are an important component of the decision to enter an export market. In this case ρ reflects the percentage of infrastructure that needs to be maintained even during a period of lower profitability. Irreversibility may also arise from the need to fit exports to the standards of the importing country (see, for example, Chen and Mattoo, 2006) . It may also 16 Alternatively, we could consider the case whereby firms can remove a certain percentage every period, or remove it entirely after a delay, however, the more restrictive assumptions considered here, while not changing the results proves to be more tractable in the stochastic framework that we will consider below. Chisik (2003) and Chisik and Davies (2004) consider the alternative assumptions in deterministic frameworks in order to analyze the evolution of trade agreements and tax treaties. 17 Alternatively, firms may have implicit contractual obligations with their workers or input suppliers arising from efficiency wage arrangements or explicit contractual obligations arising, for example, from union contracts.
be interpreted as reflecting the reduced price that would be received if the exporter was forced to sell the goods at less preferential terms on the world market. In particular, we assume that ρ(θ) is a strictly increasing function of θ. Although quality is a continuous variable firms will be restricted to choosing either high or low quality. Hence, if θ jh > θ jl , then ρ jh > ρ jl . The high and low quality irreversibility realizations are naturally confined to the interval 0 ≤ ρ jk ≤ 1 and for convenience we assume that the quality realizations lie in a bounded interval, θ, ≤ θ jk ≤⎯θ.
Each firm within each country has the same strictly increasing and strictly concave production function which yields the strictly increasing and convex aggregate cost function C(Q jkt )= 2 2 jkt Q . Note that the cost function is the same for either quality, therefore, firms will choose lower quality only as a result of irreversibility and frequent trade disputes. It is possible to interpret the cost function as only applying to export promotion and trade costs and we make use of this interpretation. In this case, a constant marginal production cost (set to zero here) permits an identical analysis.
The equality between world demand and supply for each good combined with the pricing relationship in equation (1) 
The parameter θ jk can be interpreted as an index of the gains from trade that is provided by the quadratic utility and cost functions as the difference between the intercept of the supply and the demand functions. Given that the cost functions are the same for either quality, higher quality can be seen as a greater value in the index of gains from trade.
The preferences of the identical agents in each country can be represented by a social welfare function. The numeraire good provides an excess degree of freedom, therefore, in addition to requiring balanced trade we need to separately establish market clearing for each non-numeraire good in order to describe the equilibrium. Given that there is a partially irreversible production decision, equilibrium prices will be determined by the chosen maximum output levels as well as the tariffs and we can, therefore, write country i's period t social welfare function as a function of these endogenous variables:
). Denoting δ < 1 as the discount factor, the present value of country i's payoff in some period s of the repeated game is:
Per-period welfare can be represented as the aggregate indirect expected utility function. It is the sum of expected consumer surplus, tariff revenue, and expected producer surplus:
where ( ( ), )
is the expected maximized value of consumer utility, ( ( ), )
are the firm's expected profits or losses and the middle term is tariff revenue.
Timing.
In the initial period, firms choose the level of quality and export promotion of their single export good. Governments then negotiate over a level of tariff bindings. The tariff binding is a single cooperative tariff rate ic τ that indicates the maximum rate for the combination of the observable tariff and the tariff equivalent of the unobservable trade barriers. It will be seen below that, although both countries may differ on the chosen level of tariff bindings, both will wish to raise tariffs to this level during a cooperative phase. After tariff bindings are set firms in each country simultaneously choose output.
Whereas output is unconstrained in the first period each further output decision is constrained as in equation (2). Next, outputs are revealed and governments set their tariff rates. Finally, prices are revealed, and production and consumption take place.
Equilibrium in the absence of a trade agreement.
We focus on the set of equilibria that can be supported by sequentially rational pure strategies.
Following Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) the set of pure strategy sequential equilibria (PSE) profiles {ˆ, , ,
} for this game can be described as the largest set which solves the following one period problem:
Equation (5) has two parts. The first part indicates that the static payoff from following the equilibrium strategies plus the continuation payoff induced by those strategy choices is at least as great as any other feasible strategy choice. The second part indicates that the continuation payoffs are themselves a function of equilibrium strategy choices. In this way, the continuation payoffs are credible for they are also composed of PSE strategies. It should be noted that the set of PSE profiles and resulting continuation payoffs may differ after differing histories and we have attempted to clarify this point by the notation of ˆi G for a continuation payoff that follows adherence to the static PSE strategies.
As in a framework with fully reversible capacity, one PSE for this dynamic tariff game is an infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium. In this benchmark case, firms and governments expect a Nash tariff in every period ( iE im t t τ τ = ) and firms choose the Nash capacity (
Markovian strategies is a Markov-Perfect-Equilibrium (MPE). If output decisions are fully reversible, or if no output is ever planned, then the physical environment, as described by the state variable, would look the same to the firms and the governments in every period. The unique MPE in this case would be the infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium. The irreversible output indicates that histories with positive output may generate different MPE outcomes. We now characterize this MPE set. 
Proof:
Each country's period-optimal tariff, τ im , satisfies the following first-order-condition:
There are two cases to consider. First, if ( ,0,0) This result occurs because tariffs are chose after output choices are made and, therefore, the optimal tariff drives the expected producer price to zero. Given the firms' export decisions, consumer surplus remains the same for any optimal tariff and, therefore, the Markov-Nash tariff will maximize tariff revenue and minimize expected producer revenue. Of course, foreseeing this situation, no firm would choose to export in the absence of some sort of trade agreement (whether explicit, as in this paper, or implicit). This stark outcome is a result of our assumption of segmented markets, and tariffs being chosen after output decisions are made.
where tariffs are chosen after production choices are made. In Dixit (1987) autarky is only an equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies and it only arises either because of the need for balanced trade without a numeraire good or the existence of export taxes. There is production irreversibility in Chisik (2003) , however, the lack of segmented markets does not generate autarky (even in weakly dominated strategies).
In the current framework, however, autarky is the unique MPE outcome and it requires both production irreversibility and segmented markets.
Trade Agreement Strategies
We assume that the written trade agreement restricts the set of PSE profiles to those that are welfare maximizing for the two countries for a chosen set of continuation payoffs. We start by considering symmetric continuation payoffs and then we explain these symmetric strategies as being
given by an institutional constraint and we then relax this constraint to consider welfare maximizing asymmetric trigger strategies. We refer to both sets of these profiles as trade agreement strategies, we use the superscript c to denote their cooperative nature, and we drop the time subscript to indicate that they are the tariff bindings agreed to in the initial period: { , , ,
In this uncertain environment low prices arise from unobserved tariff deviations or from macroeconomic or preference fluctuations. The imperfect tariff observability allows for countries to deviate from the agreement and blame the stochastic element. Hence, we consider trigger strategies. In particular, the trigger is given by P > 0 and, therefore, the probability that the realization of the producer price j jt P is less than the trigger value for a country j export is Pr( )
τ as the cumulative probability that the producer price j jt P is greater than the trigger price Hence the probability that both producer prices are above their trigger value, given that countries are adhering to the cooperative tariffs is
Hence, a dispute state is signaled in period t (to start in t+1) with probability 1 − φ. If there is no uncertainty, so that the random variables Hence, when countries adhere to the trade agreement strategies a trade war will start in the next period with probability (3 -2χ -χ 2 )/4. If either country deviates a dispute is triggered with probability 1.
Uninformed Dispute Settlement
In uninformed dispute settlement (UDS) there is no trade authority who attempts to discern which country is more likely to have deviated from the agreement. UDS can, therefore, do no better than recommend symmetric punishments. These symmetric punishments are typical of the trade disputes that are evidenced in many PTAs. The UDS of PTAs may, in fact, result from the GATT articles and understandings that permit their formation. For example, the 1994 Uruguay understanding on PTAs formed under article XXIV maintains that disputes in PTAs should be settled locally (and not brought to the GATT/WTO). The 1979 enabling clause goes one step further by making no mention of dispute settlement.
Given the lack of an effective trade authority, when a dispute flares up, both countries simultaneously suspend previously granted concessions and enter a trade war phase. During UDS both countries act in their own short-term self-interest, knowing that their actions will be ignored once the dispute is settled. Hence, both countries levy Markov-Nash tariffs. Given that trade disputes are entered into with strictly positive probability in any set of PSE, it is necessary that we allow for their resolution.
We model the dispute resolution as a delay in re-administering previously allowed concessions. If the countries are in a trade dispute in period t, then the probability that the dispute settlement is effective and that they resolve the dispute by period t+1 is given by π so that with probability (1−π) the countries remain in a trade dispute in the following period. 
UDS Payoff Functions
We are interested in describing three different stage game outcomes. When both countries abide by the trade agreement, firms expect a cooperative tariff and the payoff in period t can be written as 20 We could just as easily allow for finite and knowable delays so that the dispute is settled after T periods.
If one country deviates from the agreement in period t, then the optimal deviation is given by the MarkovNash tariff. Hence the deviating payoff can be written as
During a trade war, both countries levy Markov-Nash tariffs and reduce their capacity so that the trade war payoff can be written as Using Proposition 1, we have Given the UDS trade agreement strategies. the value of abiding by the agreement in some period t is given by
Note how we have relied upon the recursive structure of the model after the initial capacity choice. The value of the withdrawal of concession stage also affords a recursive representation and is given by:
Solving these two equations simultaneously yields:
We write ζ = 1
and we note that ζ ∈ (0, 1).
It is straightforward to verify that in the absence of uncertainty, so that φ = 1, the expression for
Firms
Similarly, the expected discounted value of current and future profits for a firm, given that countries are abiding by the trade agreement is
) and the expected discounted value in a withdrawal of concession stage is given by:
. Solving these simultaneously we have 
Maximizing R ic with respect to Q for the competitive firms (taking price as given) yields the competitive quantity chosen in anticipation that countries will abide by the agreement:
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(1 (1 ))( ) (1 (1 ))2 (1 )
where γ = 1−δ(1−π) and ν i = (1−φ)δρ ik 2 . It is interesting to note that if φ = 1 (or δ or ρ = 0), then (θ ik − τ jc )/2. It will also be useful to assume that π + φ are not too low.
This assumption is weakly sufficient for some of the following results, however, it allows a more intuitive presentation. It can be interpreted as requiring that, if the countries adhere to the trade agreement strategies and if they care enough about the future, then they should expect to be in a trade war less than one-half of the time. Hopefully, countries in a trade agreement could manage this minimal level of stability. On the other hand, if δ ≤ ½, then the assumption is not at all restrictive. Note as well that (13) implies that γ > ν i .
Quality Choice
For every realization of high and low quality valuations {θ ih , θ il } and low-quality irreversibility 
Proposition 2: (i.) If there is uncertainty (φ < 1), then there is a positive measure of realizations for high-quality irreversibility such that firms will choose lower quality. (ii.) If there is no uncertainty (φ = 1), (or irreversibility), then firms will choose high quality. (iii.) Firms are more likely to produce lower quality when uncertainty is large (φ is small).

Proof:
We proceed in three steps. First we show that ic k R is increasing in θ ik and decreasing in ρ ik . Next we show that it is supermodular in θ ik and −ρ ik so that more irreversibility reduces the marginal benefit of greater gains from trade. Finally we show that irreversibility has no effect when there is no uncertainty and that the effect of irreversibility is increasing in the measure of instability. 
2 2 2 3 2 From equation (16) we know that two graphs of R ic (θ ik ) that differ in their value of ρ ik can cross only once. From equations (10) and (11) we know that they must cross at θ ik = 0. Hence, for any ρ ik there exists a θ(ρ ik ) such that if ρ ih > ρ il , then θ(ρ ih ) > θ(ρ il ); and for all θ ik such that θ( In addition, note that if φ = 1, or if ρ ik = 0, then equation (14) still has the same sign, but equations (15) and (16) To establish part (iii.) note that equation (17) shows that more stability increase the slope of R ic with respect to θ ik and equation (18) shows that greater stability reduces the negative effect of irreversibility. (The assumption in (13) is used for determining the sign of equation (18) and is weakly sufficient for that result.) Finally, from equation (18) it is straightforward to see that (17) is more pronounced when there is more irreversibility. Hence, for any ρ ih > ρ il , the distance between θ(ρ ih ) and θ(ρ il ), is decreasing in φ.
is increasing in φ so that the measure of high quality irreversibility realizations that generate inefficient low-quality choices is decreasing in φ.
The essence of Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 . We see there that firms may choose lower quality if its output is more easily reversible. We also see that this effect is greater when there is more
instability.
An interesting empirical prediction that stems from Proposition 2 is that trade would be reduced more during each trade war when trade wars are more frequent. In particular, more frequent trade disputes increase the measure of high-quality irreversibility realizations such that firms will choose low quality when it is more easily reversible. When output is more reversible, trade is reduced more during a trade war.
Proposition 3: An increase in the probability, or frequency, of trade disputes weakly generates more trade reduction during each trade dispute.
Proof: From Proposition 2 we know that more frequent trade disputes (a lower value of φ) increases the benefit of choosing lower quality only because its output is more readily reversible (a lower value of ρ).
Hence, the chosen level of irreversibility is weakly decreasing in the probability of a trade dispute. From Proposition 1 we see that a lower ρ means that trade will be reduced by a greater percentage during a trade war.
An additional interesting corollary of proposition 2 is that countries with less stable economies (or governments) may end up producing lower quality. This is because macroeconomic instability impinges on the ability to accurately observe trade policies and in this framework trade disputes are only triggered more often when observability is worse. In addition, it suggests that the trading partner's macroeconomic stability and tariff observation clarity may affect the quality decision. Furthermore, if a trade relationship developed during periods when exporters expected stability (at home or abroad), then those exporters would have been more willing to devote the necessary resources to develop higher quality goods even if those goods had greater irreversibility. Hence, even if two countries face similar levels of current trade stability, initially differing levels may explain current quality choices.
An additional empirical prediction could be made with respect to changing trade patterns during trade disputes. If a country developed goods with greater gains from trade that were more irreversible, then during a trade dispute they would not be able to reduce output as much and would choose to export to third markets rather than suffer losses by exporting to the country that is levying the high tariff. This idea of trade deflection was first introduced by Bown and Crowley (2006) . The model in this paper would predict more trade deflection for countries that produce high quality goods and, therefore, for countries that industrialized in a period of expected trade stability. On the other hand, countries that industrialized while facing many changing and restrictive trade measures by their trading partners would produce lower-quality, more easily reversible, output and would simply reduce output and would not deflect trade to third countries. Interestingly enough, where as Bown and Crowley (2006) found evidence of trade deflection for Japan, in a related study they found no such evidence for China. These differing cases could be explained by the mechanism in this paper.
The Trade Agreement Tariffs
Given the trade agreement strategies, cooperating yields an expected current and continuation
On the other hand, given the FOSD of φ j ( )
as the probability that neither producer price triggers a trade war, given that country i chose a deviating tariff. A deviation, therefore, yields expected current and continuation payoffs of
The one period gain from deviating in period t can be written as
This gain must be balanced against the cost of a future trade war:
where
It is straightforward to verify that Δ is increasing in δ and in φ and is decreasing in π. Note as well that φ − φ id is non-negative and non-decreasing in τ id .
The trade agreement is described by tariff bindings {τ ic , τ jc } that maximize { , } ( , , , , , , , , , , ) 
subject to the constraint that the chosen cooperative tariffs and resulting capacity choices do not cause the gain from deviating from the agreement to be greater than the cost of a future trade war. , { , },
It is straightforward to verify that world welfare (as defined by equation 21), is a strictly decreasing function of the tariff rates (if the countries are not too asymmetric) and, therefore, is maximized by free trade. The trade agreement, therefore, specifies the lowest tariff that satisfies the incentive constraint given by equation (22). Note that when the countries differ the incentive constraint will be binding at different tariffs for each country.
The gains from a Trade Agreement
We graph country i's incentive constraint as a function of ic τ in figure 3 . In the proof to the following proposition we show that 
Proposition 4: (i.) There exists a connected set of non-prohibitive self-enforcing tariffs. (ii.) If the degree of irreversibility is sufficiently high, then the smallest member of this set, ic
τ , must be greater than zero.
The proof of Proposition 4 is contained in the appendix. The basic idea of the proof to parts (i.) and (ii.) are outlined above where we describe the shape of the incentive constraint with respect to ic τ .
Note that zero tariffs may be self-enforcing; however, if the degree of irreversibility is sufficiently high, then we must consider the case when free trade is not self-enforcing.
We also analyze the marginal effects of quality choice and of irreversibility on ic τ . It turns out that an increase in the level of the trade partner's irreversibility not only reduces the cost of deviating but it also reduces the gain from deviating. 21 Which effect dominates depends on how accurately chosen tariffs reflect received producer prices. We not only require that stability and policy perception clarity are reasonably high (so that trade wars are triggered with low probability when countries adhere to the agreement) but also that deviating tariffs are accurately evidenced as such and trigger disputes with reasonably high probability. Hence, we require that φ j ( ) id τ and, therefore, that φ d are reasonably low. It is, therefore, necessary to put some restrictions on φ and φ d . We refer to ω i = φ(φ − φ id )/(1 − φ) as country i's information representation accuracy ratio and we assume that
It is straight forward to note that along with equation (13), equation (23) implies that Δγ >ν j .
Proposition 5: (i.) If ω i > 1, then the cooperative tariff is increasing in the degree of irreversibility and
it is increasing faster when quality is higher. 
Economic Integration
When a country's own export good offers more gains from trade or has more irreversible production that country will be more dependant on the trade relationship. This dependence relaxes the incentive constraint so that the country will offer greater tariff concessions on their import good. The following proposition develops this idea of increasing integration between the countries.
Proposition 6: A country will offer greater tariff concessions (τ ic lower), if their own export good is higher quality and generates greater gains from trade (θ ik higher), or exhibits a greater degree of irreversibility (ρ ik higher).
The proof of proposition 6 is contained in the appendix. The essence of the proof is shown in
Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4 we see that greater gains from trade on a country's export good increases the discounted future cost of a current period deviation and, therefore, lowers the lowest self-enforcing tariff that a country would charge on its import good. A similar result is obtained for an increase in the degree of irreversibility and that is shown in Figure 5 .
Proposition 6 is important because it illustrates the concept of economic integration that occurs in trade agreements. If exporters choose a good with more gains from trade and more irreversibility, then they would suffer more from a temporary suspension of trade concessions. In this case the countries are more integrated and can enforce lower trade agreement tariffs.
Governments and the Quality Choice
Given that firms may inefficiently choose low quality it is natural to ask if there is a policy that governments should follow to correct this market failure. First of all, note that the absence of home consumption makes the government's quality objective similar to the firm's objective. The only possible difference is that the government can internalize the effect of quality and irreversibility on the chosen tariff. If tariffs are zero, then there is nothing to internalize and the decisions are the same. In the following proposition we also consider the secondary effects of quality and irreversibility on the cooperative tariffs and we note that if information representation transmission is reasonably accurate, then the government would also agree with the firm's decision. The proof to Proposition 7 is contained in the appendix. Note that for part (i.) the proof is identical to that of Proposition 2 with G ic replacing R ic .
Although firms may choose an inefficiently low level of quality and this may lead to a lower level of integration, Proposition 7 helps to clarify that there is no domestic market failure. That is, the quality levels are efficient at the national level so that there is no role for industrial policy to correct this type of market failure. The inefficiencies are directly tied to the trade instability and the dispute settlement procedure and, therefore, we now consider methods of improving the trade agreement.
Informed Dispute Settlement and Asymmetric Continuation Payoffs.
We now consider dispute settlement that makes careful use of the information in the public outcome. In particular, the interaction in this paper can be described as a game that has a product structure (Fudenberg et al., 1994 (Fudenberg et al., , p. 1027 . The outcomes { j jkt P , i ikt P } are statistically independent and depend only on the actions of player i ≠ j. In this case a greater level of cooperation can be enforced if the country that is more likely to have deviated is also more likely to suffer during a dispute. As Abreu et al (1990) showed, optimal continuation payoffs take a bang-bang structure. Hence, if only country j's producer price is low enough to trigger a dispute, then country i is more likely to have deviated and, therefore, they should be the only country to suffer during a dispute.
We refer to this use of information as Informed Dispute Settlement (IDS). It is straightforward to verify that IDS combined with asymmetric continuation payoffs can yield a greater level of cooperation.
In this framework greater cooperation implies that free trade is supportable for a wider range of discount factors and when it is not supportable that lower tariffs are enforceable. The level of cooperation, however, is still dependant on the levels of output and irreversibility. For a high level of irreversibility free trade cannot be supported for any discount factor.
In addition to extending the results of Abreu et al. (1990) and Fudenberg et al. (1994) to this tariff setting framework with production irreversibility we show that IDS with asymmetric continuation payoffs can mitigate the quality choice problem. The application to trade agreements is particularly apt because PTAs have very limited or non-existent dispute settlement procedures as compared to those available in the WTO. In addition, the WTO has an investigative authority that has the knowledge and ability to recommend asymmetric rewards and punishments. Hence, we can think of UDS as the norm in PTAs and IDS as the rule in the WTO. We consider a simple version of this idea below.
Informed Dispute Settlement Payoffs
The cooperative stage is defined as before.
With probability c j
ϕ ) country i will receive a producer price low enough to trigger retaliation.
Country i can retaliate with a Nash-tariff while country j levies a cooperative tariff.
( , )
With probability ( , )
Finally, with probability (1− c i ϕ )(1− c j ϕ ) both countries receive a producer price low enough to trigger a retaliatory stage. In this case there is bad news about both countries and either or both could suffer punishment. If both countries levy Nash-tariffs, then we are in the previous trade war stage. This is clearly inefficient. There is no enforcement reduction, and expected payoffs are higher, if only one country suffers the punishments stage but the recipient is selected at random. In this case, with probability ½, country i will be the retaliator and with probability ½ they will be punished. So with
ϕ ) country i will receive an expected payoff of
If countries are in a cooperative phase in period some period t, then the value of abiding by the agreement is given by
Hence, with probability The retaliation and the punishment phases also afford recursive representations and are given by:
Solving these three equations simultaneously, and writing =1 (1 ) 
So that output is the same as the UDS case considered in proposition 2. Similarly, ) and we note that γ > γ * . Similarly, note that 2γ * > δ(1 − ϕ 2 ) if ϕ(ϕ + 2π) > 3 -2/δ . This assumption is weaker than equation (13) with respect to δ and π (it is trivially satisfied if δ ≤ 2/3), however, it does place a little more restriction on ϕ. Given equation (13), it is satisfied for all δ if ϕ ≥ ½.
We show below that with IDS we also have that for all {θ ih , θ il , ρ il } there is a positive measure of highquality irreversibility realizations 1 − ρ I (θ ih , θ il , ρ il ) such that firms would choose low quality. The important point is that for all {θ ih , θ il , ρ il } this measure is strictly smaller with IDS than with UDS. The proof of Proposition 9 is contained in the appendix. The idea of the proof is illustrated in figure 6 .
We see there that firm profits are increasing faster in quality with IDS than with UDS. In addition, the negative effect of irreversibility on profits and on quality is less pronounced under IDS than under UDS.
We also see that for ρ ih > ρ il , the distance θ(ρ ih ) − θ(ρ il ) such that R iccs (θ(ρ il ),ρ il ) = R iccs (θ(ρ ih ),ρ ih ) is smaller with IDS than with UDS. Hence, it must be the case that ρ I (θ ih , θ il , ρ il ) > ρ U (θ ih , θ il , ρ il ) so that firms are less likely to choose low quality with IDS than with UDS.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered the joint choice of quality and export promotion costs when trade relationships are subject to temporary disputes. When transparency is low and macroeconomic instability is high, disputes arrive more frequently and, therefore, firms may inefficiently choose lower levels of quality and export promotion. These, in turn, build shallower trading relationships with less trade volumes and higher tariffs, and generate greater trade reductions during the more common trade disputes.
Several institutional features of the WTO that are generally lacking in PTAs such as improved transparency, dispute investigation, and the provision to recommend asymmetric continuation payoffs can ameliorate these inefficient quality choice outcomes. Hence, lower quality output and lower quality trading relationships may be more endemic to countries that depend on preferential trading areas as opposed to the WTO. 
Furthermore, when
Timing in Period t > 1
Firms choose output subject to ρ jk Q jk ≤ Q jkt ≤ Q jk .
Q jkt are revealed. Governments set tariffs.
Prices are revealed. Trade war starts next period with probability 1 − φ. Existing trade war resolved with probability π. θ(ρ il ) θ(ρ ih ) θ ik
